

government on Formosa. We have deployed our Army, our Navy, and our Air Force around China's borders, and participated in clandestine violations of her sovereignty in the air, the sea, and on the ground. We have sought to influence the countries on her borders against her with massive infusions of U.S. dollars, which we describe as "foreign aid." We have used our power, political, economic and military, to deny her the role in the United Nations provided by its Charter, and to prevent economic or diplomatic relations between her and other countries under our influence around the world. This policy has cost us billions of dollars every year for a generation. Because the only fruit of this policy is a continual worsening of our relations with China, it will eventually cost us hundreds of billions more. For the ultimate hypocrisy will occur one day when our leaders, having committed our military forces against China, tell us that we were forced into the confrontation by China's unreasonable and aggressive actions.

Obviously, our policy toward China must change. Born out of our obsession that the victory of Mao Tse-tung represented an extension of monolithic Communist power over Asia, and directed from Moscow, the policy has survived while the facts proved themselves ephemeral. Today the policy survives on inertia, fueled by an arrogant power that insists on its own interpretation of reality merely because of its power. The nature of the changes required are clear. A satisfactory conclusion to our adventure in Vietnam is the first step. A Presidential announcement of a desire to change our posture would be desirable. Concrete steps evidencing this desire would include a reduction in our military deployment around China, a discontinuance of our efforts to deny China her seat in the U.N., a willingness to begin

the exchange of visitors, particularly writers, scholars and businessmen, and most important, ending our obstruction to a resolution of the status of Formosa.

The probability that we will undertake these policy changes toward China in the near future is remote. It hinges on our ability as a nation to act in accordance with the reality of the world, to see ourselves in a different light on the world's stage, as I said earlier. Important elements in the power structure of our country—economic, political, and military—see the cold war as ultimate reality. To these elements the Communist—and Socialist—system of organizing society is so evil, so monolithic, so unchanging, and so set on controlling the world; and our system is so good, and so determined to resist, that one must destroy the other. In acting on this perception of reality the power structure does that which will create the reality—the model of the self-fulfilling prophecy. This has tended to be the pattern of our relations with the U.S.S.R. and even more so with China.

Beneficial policy changes in critical areas of the world, and even in our domestic affairs, can only be achieved as this false perception of reality is destroyed or drastically weakened. The rulers in the Kremlin have no magic power over Communist China. The dogma of communism means different things to each of them, and even if its meaning were similarly interpreted the force of dogma could not and does not prevail over conflicts of vital national interests. The communism of China does not dictate to the communism of North Korea or North Vietnam, nor that of the U.S.S.R. to Czechoslovakia or Poland when there is a conflict of national interest, as there appears to be on a growing scale. So the case for a monolithic communism can no longer stand.